报告人简介：

张昀，耶鲁大学商学院管理学博士（会计方向）；现任乔治华盛顿大学商学院会计学终身副教授，曾任杜克大学富科商学院会计学助理教授。张昀教授有丰富的管理会计的教学经验，在杜克大学及乔治华盛顿大学长期教授针对公司高管人员的课程。张昀教授的研究兴趣包括，分析式会计研究、代理问题和资本市场信息运用。他在Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting Research, 以及 Review of Accounting Studies等国际顶级期刊发表学术论文多篇。他还担任Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Management Science, Production and Operations Management and Review of Accounting Studies 等多个国际顶级期刊的评审工作。张昀教授曾在清华大学，中国人民大学，厦门大学，上海财经大学以及西南财经大学开设博士生课程。

报告简介：

We develop a theoretical model to analyze how investors' information acquisition and processing costs and mandatory disclosure affect the incidence and effectiveness of firms' communication efforts whose main objective is to help investors better understand mandatory reports. We find that the quality of mandatory disclosure can either substitute or complement firms' incentives to engage in communication efforts. For activities where firm-specific factors matter more, more accurate mandatory disclosure can discourage useful communication efforts, resulting in lower equilibrium use of information by investors and lower investment efficiency. For activities where firm-specific factors matter less, more accurate mandatory disclosure can encourage more communication efforts, leading to more efficient use of such information. We discuss the empirical and policy implications of our analyses.